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Shielding Board Members:
Municipalities Should Protect Them From Suits
Written for Publication in the New York Law Journal
August 18, 2004

John R. Nolon and Jessica A. Bacher
[John Nolon is a Professor at Pace University School of Law, Counsel for the
Land Use Law Center, and Visiting Professor at Yale’s School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies. Jessica Bacher is an Adjunct Professor at Pace
University School of Law and a Staff Attorney for the Land Use Law Center.]
Abstract: Both individual land use board members and the municipal
governments containing these boards are concerned with the liability of the
boards, and of individual members from legal challenges stemming from their
decisions. Legal actions against these boards, and the potential for subsequent
liability of individual members could put significant financial burdens on
municipalities and also discourage competent citizens from serving on these
local land use boards. This commentary reviews the impact of two recent New
York state cases, and their affect on state legislation concerning these topics.
***
In Bower Associates v. Town of Pleasant Valley, No. 2004-49 and Home
Depot, U.S.A. Inc. v. Dunn, No. 2004-50, N.Y. LEXIS 1046 (N.Y. May 13, 2004),
developers sought millions in damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the costs
associated with allegedly arbitrary delays in the project review process. In a joint
opinion, the Court of Appeals found no constitutional violations and dismissed
both cases.
Home Depot filed its civil rights action against the Mayor and City Council
members in their official and individual capacities seeking compensatory and
punitive damages. The exposure of citizen members of land use review boards
to this type of action raises serious concerns that can have negative ramifications
for the land use system. At the Land Use Law Center at Pace Law School, we
have trained hundreds of local land use officials and have heard this concern
expressed repeatedly. These two cases provide an opportunity to review the
extent of their vulnerability to such actions and the methods used by
municipalities to protect them.
Bower Associates v. Town of Pleasant Valley
In Bower Associates v. Town of Pleasant Valley, the Town wrongfully
denied Bower Associates, a housing developer, the requisite permits to build a
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three home subdivision and an access road to this and another 189 unit
subdivision in neighboring Poughkeepsie. Although Pleasant Valley cited
environmental concerns related to the Poughkeepsie subdivision, the Appellate
Division held that the Board’s denial was arbitrary, the project met all conditions
necessary for approval, and the denial was based on community pressure.
Armed with the court’s decision, Bower Associates commenced a civil rights
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking two million dollars in damages against the
Town of Pleasant Valley and its Planning Board for denial of procedural and
substantive due process, equal protection, and just compensation.

Home Depot, U.S.A. Inc. v. Dunn
In Home Depot, U.S.A. Inc. v. Dunn, Home Depot applied for site plan
approval to develop a retail establishment in the Village of Port Chester. As an
“interested agency” in the environmental review process, the neighboring City of
Rye demanded four traffic-mitigating measures. In response, Port Chester made
one of these measures, the widening of the Midland Avenue in Rye, a condition
on the site plan approval. Because Midland Avenue is a county road within Rye,
approvals from both Westchester County and Rye were necessary to comply
with the condition. Thus, without Rye’s approval, Home Depot could not
proceed.
Rye refused to consent to the permit and Home Depot commenced a
lawsuit to compel Rye to sign the permit and for damages from the Mayor and
the City Council members under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Home Depot sought fifty
million dollars in compensatory damages and unspecified punitive damages, for
the delay in construction. The court held that Rye’s insistence on the traffic
mitigation measure and then its refusal to approve the permit was arbitrary and
capricious. During the proceedings, Home Depot’s site plan approval expired.
After a third environmental review, Port Chester approved the site plan without
the condition to widen Midland Avenue. Home Depot’s civil rights action for the
arbitrary delay in this approval proceeded to the Court of Appeals.

Holding
In both cases, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no
constitutional violation and dismissed the developers’ complaints. “The point is
simply that denial of a permit—even an arbitrary denial redressable by an article
78 or other state law proceeding—is not tantamount to a constitutional violation
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; significantly more is required.” Bower Associates v.
Town of Pleasant Valley, No. 2004-49, No. 2004-50, 2004 N.Y. LEXIS 1046, at
*9-*10 (N.Y. May 13, 2004). According to the court, § 1983 “is not simply an
additional vehicle for judicial review of land-use determination.” Id., at *9.
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Substantive Due Process
“In the land-use context, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects against municipal
actions that violate a property owner’s rights to due process, equal protection of
the laws and just compensation for the taking of property under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United State Constitution.” Id. (citing Town of
Orangetown v. Magee, 665 N.E.2d 1061 (N.Y. 1996)). “Both cases … center on
alleged deprivation of substantive due process.” Id. Substantive due process
cases are traditionally brought in federal court and in the context of land use
have been addressed by the Court of Appeals only once, in Town of Orangetown
v. Magee.
In 1996, the Town of Orangetown sought to terminate the
development of an industrial park which had been granted a building permit. As
work on the large commercial project progressed, community opposition to the
building became organized and political. The resistance was so serious that the
Town Supervisor eventually directed the building inspector to revoke the
developer’s permit. Although the Town presented a series of defenses for its
actions, the Court of Appeals held that the revocation of the permit was only an
effort to satisfy political concerns and therefore not legal. Such an action, taken
without a reasonable basis in fact, is arbitrary and capricious and violates the
developer’s due process rights and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The developer in this case
was awarded five million dollars, in addition to legal fees and expenses, for the
illegal revocation of its building permit. See Town of Orangetown, 665 N.E.2d
1061.
In Magee, the Court of Appeals established a two-part test for substantive
due process violations. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the claimant must first demonstrate a legitimate
claim of entitlement to the property right in question. “The key to determining the
existence of a property interest is the extent to which the deciding authority may
exercise discretion in reaching its decision, rather than the estimate of the
likelihood of a certain decision.” Penlyn Dev. Corp. v. Incorporated Village of
Lloyd Harbor, 51 F. Supp. 2d 255, 261 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Crowley v.
Courville, 76 F. 3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1996)). Second, even when it is shown that a
demonstrable property interest has been denied, the claimant must demonstrate
that the “governmental action was wholly without legal justification.” Bower
Associates, 2004 N.Y. LEXIS 1046, at *11.
The two-part test strikes an appropriate balance between the role of
local governments in regulatory matters affecting the health,
welfare and safety of their citizens, and the protection of
constitutional rights at the very outer margins of municipal behavior.
It represents an acknowledgment that decisions on matters of local
concern should ordinarily be made by those whom local residents
select to represent them in municipal government. Id., at *14
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The Magees satisfied both of these requirements. They established that
their right to develop the land had vested under state law: they had expended
substantial sums on the project, obtained a valid permit to build, and had
completed substantial construction on the land. In addition, they proved that the
Town’s actions were without legal justification and were motivated entirely by
political concerns.
Bower Associates and Home Depot failed to establish either factor.
Where the land use review board has discretion in approving or denying the
application, entitlement can only be established when approval is “virtually
assured.” Id., at *13. Neither Bower Associates nor Home Depot, unlike the
Magees, could show that the boards’ discretion to approve the actions had been
so circumscribed as to create a clear entitlement to approval. A victory in an
article 78 proceeding does not remove all further discretion from the board
sufficiently to establish a constitutionally protected property interest. “As for the
second element of the test, ‘only the most egregious official conduct can be said
to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense.’” Id., at *13 (quoting City of Cuyahoga
Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188 (2003)). The court found this
egregious conduct lacking on the part of Rye and Pleasant Valley.

Individual Liability for Board Members
Home Depot filed its claim not only against the City, but also against the
Mayor and the City Council members both personally and officially. Unlike the
Bower Associates, Home Depot filed the civil rights action at the same time that it
brought its article 78 action to compel Rye to sign the permit; not with its article
78 relief in hand. A few months before filing its claims, Home Depot sent a letter
threatening the damages action unless Rye signed the county permit. An
interoffice memorandum was cited to show that Home Depot saw the § 1983
action as leverage against Rye for settlement. Id., at *6. Implicitly, the company
thought that the threat of board member liability would give it leverage in forcing
a positive decision on its application.
This type of action raises many concerns among local land use board
members as to whether and to what extent they are liable for their board’s
actions in such cases.
Further, they are anxious to know what their
municipalities can do to protect them from any liability they may incur. A
municipality can choose to defend and indemnify local officials, including board
members, under § 18 of the New York State Public Officers Law. N.Y. PUB. OFF.
LAW 18 (3)(a). When § 18 was proposed by the New York Law Revision
Commission it stated that it would “be difficult for many public entities to attract
and keep competent public officers and employees," particularly those employed
by small municipalities "where the compensation is minimal or nonexistent." New
York Law Revision Comm'n, Memorandum Relating to Indemnification and
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Defense of Public Officers and Employees, 204th Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1981),
(reprinted in 1981 N.Y. Laws 2314). The Commission further found that
"government cannot effectively function without some assurance that its
members will not be called upon to personally defend themselves against claims
arising out of the daily operation of the government or to account in damages
therefor.” Id.
Under § 18, the municipality has the duty to provide for the defense
against any “civil action or proceeding, state or federal, arising out of any alleged
act or omission which occurred or allegedly occurred while the employee was
acting within the scope of his public employment or duties.” N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW
18 (3)(a). The municipality is required to pay litigation expenses and reasonable
attorneys’ fees. In addition, § 18 provides that the municipality shall indemnify
and save harmless officers for any judgment obtained or settlement that the
municipality has approved in such actions. Section 18 does not authorize a
municipality to indemnify a local official for punitive or exemplary damages.
A local government may supplement the provisions of § 18 and provide
indemnification for punitive damages. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW 18(4)(C). The City of
Rye provides its public officers with the full benefits of § 18. RYE, N.Y., CODE §
145-2. In addition, Rye specifically provides indemnification for punitive and
exemplary damages in any civil action or proceeding in which it is alleged that
the officer or employee has violated the civil rights of the claimant under Section
1981 and 1983 of the Civil Rights Act provided that the officer was “acting in
good faith and within the scope of his public employment, powers and duties.”
RYE, N.Y., CODE § 145-3.

Conclusion
Local board members should investigate whether the benefits of § 18 and
further protection from punitive damage awards have been made available by
their municipalities through measures such as those adopted by the City of Rye.
Municipalities, in order to recruit local land use board members and enable them
to make sound decisions in the community’s interest should afford such
protections. Further, they should be certain that their municipal insurance
policies cover the costs of the defense of actions and the payment of any
judgments awarded.
In such cases, actions such as that brought by Home Depot will not be
effective to force settlement out of fear of liability. On their part, local officials are
advised to protect themselves from the anxiety of lawsuit and the cost of litigation
by avoiding arbitrary actions in reviewing and approving land use applications.
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